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  Parents have their children specialize in schooling rather than go to work in part because 
they expect that children will earn enough as adults to repay the lost earnings as a child. 
However, children from poor households may not have the luxury of waiting to grow up before 
entering the labor market. Sending their children to work may be the only option poor parents 
have to sufficiently raise income to meet current consumption needs, so poor parents forego the 
increased future income opportunity to meet basic necessities.  One argument for government 
efforts to limit child labor is that poor parents may under-invest in their children's education 
relative to the social optimum. Those parents' decisions may not take into account societal 
returns associated with improved education such as poverty reduction, slower population growth, 
improved health, reduced crime, and a lower dependence on government transfer programs. 
The rationale for government intervention assumes that children who do not work will 
earn more as adults, and that these future returns are sufficiently high to justify the current loss of 
income from reduced child labor. However, there is very little empirical research on the impact 
of child labor on the child's earnings potential as an adult. Empirical estimation is necessary 
because theory yields ambiguous predictions about the impact of early labor market entry on 
lifetime earnings. Child labor need not lower lifetime earnings, and could even increase lifetime 
earnings for some children. 
One way child labor can alter adult earnings is by changing the number of years of 
schooling children attain. Past studies have shown that a child’s years of schooling may be   2
increased or decreased when the child works. Psacharopoulos (1997) found evidence that child 
labor lowered grade attainment, while Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) found that child 
labor lowered measured school achievement per year. Other studies have found the opposite 
results, however. Because many working children also are in school, some analysts have 
suggested that child labor and schooling are not mutually exclusive (Ravallion and Wodon 2000) 
and may even be complementary activities (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997). One reason is 
that child labor may raise household income sufficiently to allow the household to afford to send 
at least some of their children to school, whether it is the working children or their siblings. 
Without income derived from working children, these households may not be able to send any 
children to school. 
It is even possible that child labor can raise lifetime earnings of children as adults. 
Standard theory of earnings initiated by Mincer (1974) argues that work experience raises wages, 
presumably because human capital is generated through learning by doing. It is possible that 
returns to a year of work experience dominate the returns to a year of schooling, particularly in 
developing countries where schools available to poor households often are of poor quality. It also 
is possible that by increasing current household income, child labor allows the parents to build an 
endowment of physical assets that can be transferred to the child at maturity. These physical 
assets may have a greater return in credit-constrained developing countries than do the foregone 
human capital assets.
1 
This study measures the impact of child labor on adult wages and poverty incidence 
through each of these potential avenues. Using a unique data set on adult earnings in Brazil, child 
labor is allowed to affect adult earnings through its impacts on work experience, years of 
                                                 
1 Parsons and Goldin (1989) found that in U.S. households in 1890, child labor income primarily went toward 
current household consumption and little if any physical assets were transferred to working children when they 
reached adulthood.   3
schooling, and human capital attained per year of schooling. Adding up these positive and 
negative effects, the empirical findings demonstrate that early entry to the workforce reduces 
lifetime earnings by 13% to 20%. Child labor also raises the probability of being poor later in life 
by 13% to 31%. 
These findings have important policy implications. Reducing child labor can significantly 
improve children's adult wages, income, and poverty status, so governments can trade off current 
costs of child labor eradication programs against future lower costs of poverty programs and/or 
increased tax returns.  Policies that keep working children in school also are supported because 
the positive effect of increased educational attainment on adult income is larger than the negative 
effect of child labor on earnings. 
Trends and Tradeoffs Between Child Labor and Education in Brazil  
As shown by Duryea et al. (Chapter 4), the incidence of child labor in Brazil has 
decreased over time. The cumulative distribution of the age of workforce entry by birth cohort is 
presented in figure 1. The median age at entry was 12.5 for the cohort aged 40 to 49 in 1996. It 
increased 1.5 years to age 14 for the cohort aged 20 to 29. Much of the change in average cohort 
age is due to the decreasing frequency of very early entry into the labor force. One-third of the 
cohort aged 40 to 49 had entered the labor force by age 10, but the incidence had fallen to 20% 
for the cohort aged 20 to 29. 
The relationship between age of labor market entry and years of education by birth cohort 
is illustrated in figure 2. The relationship is quite stable across birth cohorts. Overall, as age of 
labor market entry increases, years of education completed also increase. However, there is no 
gain in average schooling by delaying labor market entry from age 4 to age 10. Over that range, 
average schooling remains constant at four years. One interpretation of figure 2 is that the 
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increasing educational attainment in Brazil is due not to increased educational attainment of 
working children, but to delayed age of labor market entry for more recent birth cohorts. 
There is a strong circumstantial case that early entry into the labor market has adverse 
consequences for adult income. Table 1 reports the probability of beimng in the lowest income 
quintile as an adult by years of education and age of labor market entry.  The lowest income 
quintile in Brazil can be viewed as being extremelyu poor by nternatiopnal standards.  The 
probability of being extremely poor declines as age of labor market entry and years of education 
increase. Child labor appears to be particularly damaging for the 39% of adults who began 
working before age 13. Of those, 56% are in the lowest two income quintiles, and one-third are 
in the lowest income quintile. However, increasing years of education mitigates the impact of 
early labor market entry. 
Table 2 shows similar adverse impacts of early labor market entry on wages as an adult. 
Those who entered before age 13 earned 49% less than those who entered between the ages of 13 
and 15. Again, education appears to mitigate the effect. For those with at least four to seven 
years of education, generally considered sufficient to attain literacy, the adverse effects of early 
labor market entry become less clear. 
These findings suggest that if a working child remains in school, adult earnings may not 
suffer. That fact supports the argument that policies restricting child labor could do more harm 
than good. In Brazilian households that have child workers, child labor represents 17% of urban 
household income and 22% of rural household income. Given the strong positive effect of 
household income on child schooling, it is plausible that child labor could self-correct its adverse 
consequences on adult earnings by inducing additional years of schooling. Econometric 
estimation is necessary to assess whether these positive aspects of child labor outweigh the 
apparent negatives for lifetime earnings.   5
Theory 
Figure 3A illustrates the tradeoff between early labor market entry versus later entry with 
a longer period of specialization in schooling.
2  This assumes that the returns to a year spent in 
school are higher when specializing in school (A = 1) as opposed to sharing time between school 
and work (0 < A < 1). The horizontal axis represents increasing levels of additional years of 
schooling, Et. 
Wages as an adult are assumed to be an increasing function of schooling so that 
A), , h(E lnW t =  with hE > 0 and hA > 0. Children can gain earnings potential through on-the-job 
training as well as schooling, so there is a possibility that early entry into the labor market will 
result in higher earnings than would specializing in schooling for only a few years. This 
possibility is allowed by letting part-time schooling result in higher wages at low levels of 
schooling. Eventually, the higher rate of increase in human capital from schooling overtakes the 
initial gain to early labor market entry, so at higher education levels,  ). 1 A h(E 1) A h(E t t < > =  
As drawn in figure 3A, maximizing lifetime income would involve going to work 
immediately for all who plan to go to school Em additional years or less and would involve full-
time schooling for those planning to attend beyond Em years. If a child drops out at t = 0, he 
would have a lifetime wage equal to  C α .  
The optimal choice of years of schooling involves setting the rate of growth of human 
capital in school equal to the cost of borrowing. If r is the interest rate, this means choosing the 
level of schooling, Et, such that r =  t E h/∂ ∂ . 
                                                 
2 This section is a simplified version of the model outlined by Rosen (1977). 
   6
The optimum is shown as the tangency between log isopresent value lines that have a 
slope equal to r and the log wage function that has a slope equal to  t E h/∂ ∂ .
3  As shown in figure 
3A, generally there will be two levels of education that satisfy that condition, E0 for the part-time 
schooling option and E1 for the full-time schooling option. The parents should pick A = 1 or 
A < 1 depending on which yields the highest present value. As drawn in figure 3A, the full-time 
schooling option (A = 1) dominates because  , 1) A V(E 1) A V(E 0 1 < > =  where  ) A V(E i t  is the 
present value of the wage associated with a given level of education, Et, and attendance choice, 
Ai. 
However, full-time schooling will not always dominate part-time schooling. As r 
increases, eventually the higher present value will be the part-time schooling option, and at even 
higher levels of r, the drop-out option dominates. Higher values of r would be expected to be 
associated with lower household income to the extent that poorer households face more 
constrained credit options, so children in poor households will drop out more readily or split time 
between school and work. These predictions are borne out in the stylized facts reported by 
Duryea et al. (Chapter 4). This also reinforces why government intervention combating child 
labor may be socially optimal. If the government's discount rate is less than that of the 
household, the government would prefer a higher level of schooling investment than the 
household would select on its own.
4 
                                                 
3 The log isopresent value lines have an intercept equal to the log of the present value of the wage weighted by the 
interest rate. The continuous discounted present value formula is  . } ) , ( exp{
1













= − =   
Taking logs and rearranging yields the familiar relationship,  , ) ln( ln t rE rV W + =  where the logarithm of the 
wage is linear in years of schooling. 
 
4 Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) developed and implemented a strategy for testing whether credit constraints led 
households to use child labor to smooth income in the face of unanticipated income loss.  Beegle et al (2002), and 
Edmonds (2002) are more recent papers that find evidence that poor househgolds face credit constraints.   7
Part-time schooling and drop-out also are more likely to dominate when schools are poor, 
so that earnings growth from schooling is slower. Figure 3B illustrates this point. Holding r at the 
same level as in 3A, a flatter profile for h(Et|A = 1) now results in the part-time schooling option 
having the higher present value of earnings. 
This model demonstrates that early entry into the labor market could raise lifetime 
wealth, particularly for children facing poor schools and high discount rates. Whether child labor 
does in fact raise or lower measured adult wealth indicators requires empirical investigation. 
Data 
The analysis is based on the 1996 round of the national sample survey of households, 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). PNAD, conducted annually by the 
Brazilian government, is a nationally representative stratified random sample of the Brazilian 
population designed to monitor the socioeconomic characteristics of the population including 
education, labor, residency, and earnings. The 1996 survey is particularly suited to the needs of 
this study in that it includes a retrospective question on age of labor market entry and 
information about the parents of a subset of the adult respondents. 
This study's empirical estimates of the impact of child labor on lifetime earnings rely on 
the ability of respondents to recall whether they worked when they were young. In theory, recall 
bias should be less severe for repeated activities such as work, but it is useful to compare the 
recall data to contemporaneously collected data on the incidence of child labor. The implied 
child labor force participation rates based on recall data are larger than the official rates reported 
by the International Labor Organization (ILO), as shown in table 3.   8
Two reasons indicate why the retrospective data show a higher incidence of child labor 
than would contemporaneously collected surveys. The first is that children are likely to enter and 
exit the labor market, as demonstrated by Duryea et al. (Chapter 4). Consequently, those who 
first entered the labor market at an early age may not have remained in the labor force 
continuously thereafter. The second is that the retrospective data capture informal and part-time 
work that may not be captured in contemporaneous survey data. In contrast, the ILO data refer 
only to full-time work. In his survey of child labor literature, Basu (1999) reported that when 
ILO estimates were adjusted to include part-time work, the incidence of child labor more than 
doubled. In fact, the incidence of child labor implied by the retrospective data reported in table 3 
is nearly twice that of the ILO estimates. Thus, the retrospective data track the 
contemporaneously collected data quite well. 
Estimation Strategy 
There is a long tradition of examining returns to school by using earnings functions. 
Following Welch (1966), analysis of returns to education was extended to incorporate returns to 
school quality. Card and Krueger (1992) used a similar strategy to analyze the effects of school 
and teacher attributes on lifetime earnings. Child labor can be incorporated into the earnings 
function framework in the same manner as school quality. To begin, approximate the true 
structural relationship between education, E, and child labor, C, as: 
  i i C C E β = ) (  (1) 
where the parameterβ captures the effects of early labor force entry on lifetime educational 
attainment. The coefficientβ can be positive or negative. 
Now consider the complete relationship between earnings (and poverty) and child labor. 
Consider the log earnings function:   9
  i i i i CE i i E i C i C E C C E C W ε α α α α + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ln 0  (2) 
where the i α  are coefficients and  i ε  is the error term. Note that the specification in equation 2 
captures the potential channels through which early entry in the workforce may affect lifetime 
earnings as discussed in the theory. The term i CC α  captures the direct effect of child labor on 
adult earnings, whether through physical capital endowments inherited from the parents or from 
work experience. The term  i EE α represents the returns to full-time investment in schooling (A=1 
in the theory), while  i i CE E C α  captures the difference in adult earnings between full-time and 
part-time (A<1) investment in schooling.  




























whereC is the mean rate of child labor andE is mean education level.
5  Regrouping terms in (3) 
































The first term in square brackets in equation (4) is the direct effect of child labor on earnings. 
The next two terms capture the indirect effects, i.e., through the effects on educational attainment 
and returns to education. 
                                                 
5 If child labor is measured as a discrete rather than as a continuous variable, the discrete corollary to (3) would be 
1 | ) 0 | 1 | )( (
) ln(
= + = − = + + =
∆
∆
C E CE C E C E CE E C
C
i W
α α α α . 
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  One option is to derive a relationship defining the locus of equilibrium points between 
age of entry into the labor market and years of attained schooling. As figure 2 demonstrates, the 
locus of points has been very stable over time. An alternative is to derive a structural relationship 
between child labor and educational attainment by empirically identifying factors that shift C but 
not E and applying instrumental variables. Either method will yield estimates ofβ  that can be 
inserted into (4) to derive the indirect effect of child labor on adult earnings through education. 
As demonstrated below, both options yield similar estimates ofβ . 







 as the coefficient on 
child labor in an earnings function in which years of education is excluded as a regressor. In (2), 
with child labor measured as a discrete variable, the coefficient on Ci would be equal to 








in magnitude because the simple auxiliary regression of E on C would be expected to yield an 







 will serve as a useful reference for the structural estimate based on (4). 
Empirical Findings 
A. Summary Statistics 
The sample of adult wage earners is taken as the PNAD respondents over 18 years of age 
who were out of school.  Summary statistics of the samples used in the analysis are presented in 
table 4, which also presents summary statistics for those who started working prior to their 13th 
birthday and those who began working later. On average, the sample who are sons and daughters   11
of the household head were younger, more educated, began working later, and were lower paid 
than the full sample. Those who began working at an earlier age were more likely to be male, 
rural residents, and have a less educated parent. 
B. Econometric Results 
Estimates of equation (2), augmented with the other variables in table 4 and controls for 
state of residence, are reported in table 5.
6  Four measures of adult earnings are used as 
dependent variables: the logs of hourly wage and household income and status in the lowest one- 
and two-income quintiles. The measure of child labor, CHLAB, takes the value of one if the 
respondent worked during his first 12 years of life and zero otherwise. This cruder dummy 
variable is used instead of the reported age at labor market entry to reduce the measurement error 
problems associated with retrospective data. The presumption is that adults can more accurately 
recall working as young children than the actual age at which they initiated work. 
A subset of the sample had no wages, either because they were out of the labor force, 
unemployed, or worked without reported wages. To correct for possible sample selection bias, a 
maximum likelihood version of Heckman's (1978) correction was implemented. Instruments in 
the auxiliary equation for the probability of wage work included the number of children and total 
individuals in the household, regional industry mix, and regional adult unemployment rate and 
regional per capita income. Household demographic composition, regional unemployment, and 
per capita income are proxies for individual reservation wage.  The industry mix is used to 
control for the probability of nonwage work. Note all wage regressions include controls for 
average wages in the state, so these measures of industry mix reflect variation in the types of 
work done, holding average wages constant.  In practice, the uncorrected and corrected 
                                                 
6 To conserve space, the coefficients on the state dummies are not reported in the tables. The full set of results is 
available on request. 
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parameter estimates were virtually identical, so issues of selection appear not to have been that 
critical.  Only the selection-corrected estimates are reported to conserve space. 
The log wage equations mimic standard results. Wages have a concave pattern over the 
life cycle. The implied returns to schooling of 10.8% per year were consistent with those 
reported by Lam and Schoeni (1993) for Brazil when controlling for family background 
variables. Wages were higher for urban, male, and unionized workers, and were lower for 
minority groups except Asians. Workers in jobs that were not permanent also were paid a 
premium. 
The parameters of primary interest are  . and , , CE E C α α α   Interestingly,  , 0 > C α  
suggesting that at zero years of education, child labor leads to higher lifetime earnings. This is 
consistent with the presumption that child labor can increase human capital through on-the-job 
training. However, child labor also makes education less efficient at producing human capital, so 
. 0 < CE α   Before proceeding to the numerical estimate of child labor on adult earnings, the 






C. The Effect of Child Labor on Years of Education 
As discussed in the introduction, past studies have disagreed about whether child labor 
increases or decreases years of education. Such estimates are needed to derive the indirect impact 
of child labor on earnings through the implied impact on human capital. The equilibrium locus of 
points in figure 2 suggests that for each year the child remains out of the labor market past the 
age of 10, attained schooling increases by .58 years.
7   Using the sample statistics in table 4, the 
                                                 
7 The regression pooling the three cohorts of observations from figure 2 is 
(.03) (.21) (.18)
ENTRY) OF AGE 20 * D10) (1 * .58 D10 * 5.95 10.13 Attainment Education − − − − =
 
where D10 is a dummy variable indicating age of entry at 10 or less and (20-AGE OF ENTRY) is the number of 
years spent in the labor market by age 20.   13
average age of labor market entry for those who did not work in their first 12 years  was 16.77 
years, implying 4.77 years of additional specialization in schooling. The implied increase in 
years of schooling for those who began working after age 12 is .58·(4.77) = 2.8 years. The 
corresponding estimate in Psacharopoulos' (1997) study of Bolivian and Venezuelan working 
children is two years of reduced educational attainment.  
These are not structural estimates, however. To the extent that years of education and 
child labor are simultaneously determined, these estimates based on market equilibrium 
outcomes should overstate the true impact of child labor on years of completed schooling. To 
address this problem, the study used a subset of the PNAD sample of adults who were still living 
with their parents. Because the PNAD collected information on all household members, there is 
information on household demographics including the number of siblings as well as education 
and gender of the household head. That subset permits prediction of the incidence of child labor 
using household attributes and local labor market conditions as instruments. The predicted 
probability of child labor was used in a second-stage estimate explaining variation in completed 
years of schooling. 
In particular, the structural impact of child labor on schooling was estimated using a 
probit equation of the form 
C e R H X C + + + = 3 2 1 γ γ γ ,         ( 5 )  
where C is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the adult worked in the first 12 years of 
life, H is a vector of household attributes believed to affect the child's reservation wage, R is a 
vector of local industry shares that should affect the market opportunities for child labor in the 
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region without altering returns to schooling
8, and X includes demographic and economic factors 
believed to affect both child labor and education choices. The predicted probability of working 
as a child was then inserted into a second-stage regression explaining completed years of 
education, E: 
E e X C E + + = δ β ˆ ,       ( 6 )  
The sample on which the estimation of equations (5) and (6) is based is not random. Adults who 
are living with their parents are likely to be atypically low-skilled and unsuccessful in the labor 
market. For that reason, the estimate for (6) uses the maximum likelihood variant of the 
Heckman sample selection model to control for possible self-selection in the sample of adults 
living with their parents. 
The results from the second-stage estimation are reported in table 6. Standard errors of 
the coefficient are corrected for the two-step procedure using a bootstrap procedure. Other things 
equal, children in urban areas finish 1.5 more years of school on average than do their rural 
counterparts. Children in regions with low unemployment and high per capita income attend 
school longer, so stronger labor demand helps keep children in school, presumably because the 
parents remain employed. Girls complete 1.4 more years on average than do boys. Child 
schooling also is positively related to the household head's education and the household's income 
status. 
Turning to the primary coefficient of interest, working in the first 12 years of life lowers 
completed years of schooling by 1.7 years relative to otherwise identical individuals from 
observationally identical households. The magnitude appears to be reasonable compared to the 
upper-bound estimate of 2.8 years based on figure 2. Comparable structural estimates reported 
                                                 
8 At very young ages, child wages should be driven more by physical stature and not by current schooling.  Future   15
by Emerson and de Souza (2000) averaged 2.2 years, so the estimate of 1.7 years appears 
reasonable and is used in the estimates discussed below. 
D. Indirect Effects of Child Labor on Adult Earnings 
The direct effect of child labor on life earnings combines two influences, reported as 
) | ( 1 = + C CE C E α α  at the bottom of table 5. The first effect captures the potential impact of early 
entry into the labor market on wages through greater years in the labor market. The second effect 
captures the impact of child labor on returns per years of schooling completed. The negative 
effect of child labor on returns to education dominates the positive effect on occupational human 
capital. Consequently, working in the first 12 years of life has a direct effect of reducing adult 
hourly wages by 4.2%. 





 from the estimation of equation (6) in table 6, the indirect 
effect of child labor on adult wages can be computed through its negative impact on attained 






+ ) ( 3 2 α α  at the bottom of table 5. The impact is significant, 
reducing adult wages by 16.1%. Consequently, the total effect of early child labor is to reduce 
adult wages by 20.3%. The implied reduction in adult wages using a similar regression excluding 
the education terms is 31.8%, so the structural estimate does not appear too large. 
The impact of child labor on household income may be larger or smaller than its impact 
on individual wages.  If child labor increases the probability of unemployment as an adult, then 
child labor will ower adult income both by lowering payment per hour and by lowering the 
expected number of hours worked per year.   However, child labor may also affect the type of 
spouse one can attract as an adult.  If those who worked as children marry other child workers 
                                                                                                                                                             
returns to schooling should not be affected by the mix of industries in the local labor market, but the mix of 
industries will affect how many jobs there are for children.   16
whose wages were suppressed, then the marriage market will magnify the adverse impacts of 
child labor on adult poverty. However, if those who attained little education can marry more 
educated spouses or if more members of the households of child laborers work, then some of the 
adverse impacts of child labor on adult income may be mitigated.  
The second column in table 5 regresses per capita household income on child labor 
measures. The coefficient on child labor  C α  turns negative, so that child workers at zero 
education have household income that is 3% lower than those who did not work in their first 12 
years. The penalty of child labor on returns to education also becomes greater so the direct effect 
of child labor is to reduce adult household income by 11%. 
At least some of the negative effects on individual wages appear to be mitigated by 
household formation.  Most notably, women who face a 58% wage disadvantage in column 1 
only face a 3% loss of household income, presumably because they can pool income with higher 
wage males.  However, the adverse effect of child labor on wages is not reduced by pooling 
incomes within households.  The indirect effect of child labor on household income is only 
modestly smaller than its effect on wages: -15.7%. The total impact of child labor is to reduce 
adult household income by 26.7%, even larger than the adverse effect of child labor on hourly 
earnings. The comparable estimate from the regression excluding education is an implied income 
reduction of 38.9%, so this structural estimate does not appear too large relative to that reduced-
form estimate. 
The last two columns report the probability that a child laborer is in the bottom one or 
two income quintiles as an adult. Individuals who worked in their first twelve years of life were 
7.8% more likely to be in the lowest income quintile and 13.7% more likely to be in the lowest 
two quintiles than were otherwise observationally equivalent adults who did not work until age 
13 or later. The corresponding reduced form estimates are 9.5% and 16.9%.   17
The implication is that adults who worked as children experience a significant and large 
loss of lifetime earnings. Child laborers are significantly more likely to be poor as adults, both 
because they have lower human capital and because they marry individuals with low earnings 
potential.  
Conclusion 
This study quantifies the effects of child labor on the wages, income, and poverty status 
of those same individuals as adults. A procedure was used that incorporated three possible 
channels through which child labor could affect outcomes. Child labor can alter years of attained 
education, the returns per year of education, and human capital production outside of school. 
The empirical findings suggest that early entry in the workforce reduces years of 
education and lowers the returns per year of schooling. However, there is some evidence that 
child labor also may create occupational human capital that can raise an individual's adult wages. 
Regardless, the adverse effects of child labor on the quantity and productivity of schooling 
swamp any positive effects, so that the overall impact is to reduce adult hourly wages by 20%. 
Whether because they are inferior marriage prospects or because they work more uncertain 
hours, child labor lowers adult household income by an even greater amount than it does hourly 
wages.  Child workers were 14% more likely to be in the lowest two income quintiles as adults 
compared to otherwise identical children who did not enter the labor market until after age 12. 
The results suggest that policies that delay age of entry into the labor market such as 
truancy laws or child labor prohibitions may have a significant impact on adult incidence of 
poverty.  While these laws may be expensive to enforce, the enhanced future earnings of children 
who remain out of the labor force as a result of the laws may provide sufficient revenue to justify 
the cost.  Alternatively, higher future earnings could help justify the expense of providing current  
poor parents an income transfer conditional on their children not working.     18
Our findings also support policies that keep children in school even if they work.  While 
child labor reduces the productivity of schooling, the net effect of an additional year of schooling 
on adult wages is still positive, even if the child works while in school. Consequently, policies 
that delay drop-out even if the child works, such as providing night schools or training at work, 
may be partially effective at lowering the likelihood of adult poverty for current working 
children.    19
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Table 1: Proportion of Population Over 18 in the Lowest Income Quintile, 1996, by Age of Labor Force Entry and 
Education. 
 








> 18  None  1 to 3  4 to 7  8 to 11  12 or more    Total 
Age at Entry                 
Before 13  39  83%  70%  51%  28%  9%    56% 
   (60%)  (44%)  (25%)  (10%)  (4%)    (33%) 
13 to 15  26  76%  64%  42%  19%  6%    36% 
   (51%)  (35%)  (18%)  (6%)  (2%)    (17%) 
16 to 19  24  68%  59%  42%  19%  4%    27% 
   (43%)  (29%)  (18%)  (6%)  (2%)    (11%) 
After 20  11  64%  58%  43%  22%  4%    24% 
   (39%)  (26%)  (18%)  (7%)  (2%)    (10%) 
Total 100  80%  67%  46%  22%  5%    41% 
   (56%)  (39%)  (21%)  (7%)  (2%)    (21%) 
 
 a Numbers in parentheses represent proportions in the lowest income quintile. Unbracketed numbers represent 






Table 2: Distribution of Wage (R$/Hr) for Population Over 18, by Age of Workforce Entry and Education, 1996.  
 
   






> 18  None  1 to 3  4 to 7  8 to 11  12 or more    Total 
Age at Entry                 
Before 13  39  0.77  1.07  1.69  2.92  7.41    1.79 
13 to 15  26  0.85  1.18  1.74  3.09  8.26    2.66 
16 to 19  24  0.96  1.39  1.62  2.53  7.3    3.03 
After 20  11  1.01  1.28  1.28  2.21  8.54    4.02 
Total 100  0.81  1.14  1.67  2.76  7.87    2.51 
 
 
Table 3: Retrospective and Contemporaneous Measures of the Incidence of Child Labor in Brazil, Ages 10 to 14. 
 1960  1970  1980 
Retrospective PNAD 1996
a  46.2 38.8  33.5 
Contemporaneous ILO
b  22.2 20.3  19.0 
aAuthors' calculations using 1996 PNAD.  
bCited in Basu (1999).   22
 






Those Who Started 
Working Before Age 13 
 
Those Who Started 
Working After Age 12 
 
  1 2 1 2 1 2 
Wage  (R$  per  hour)  2.51 1.49 1.78 0.88 3.02 1.78 
  (4.73) (2.31) (3.30) (1.35) (5.47) (2.59) 
Educational  Attainment  (Years)  6.52 7.31 4.45 4.92 8.00 8.40 
  (4.45) (4.16) (3.73) (3.66) (4.33) (3.92) 
Age at Entry in Workforce  13.92  14.73  9.88  10.11  16.77  16.84 
  (4.52) (4.12) (1.74) (1.65) (3.63) (3.06) 
Entered  Workforce  Before  Age  13  0.41 0.31 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.49) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age  (Years)  32.34 25.05 33.60 25.01 31.45 25.06 
  (9.11) (6.61) (9.26) (6.88) (8.90) (6.48) 
Female  0.42 0.39 0.35 0.27 0.47 0.45 
  (0.49) (.49) (0.48)  (0.45)  (0.50) (.50) 
Rural  0.19 0.19 0.32 0.41 0.10 0.09 
  (0.39)  (.39)  (0.47) (0.49) (0.30) (0.29) 
Union  .1603 .1081 .1339 .0714 .1788 .1249 
  (.3669) (.3105) (.3406) (.2574) (.3832) (.3306) 
Ethnicity:  White  .5355 .5279 .4734 .4352 .5794 .5703 
  (.4987) (.4992) (.4993) (.4958) (.4937) (.4951) 
Black  .0674 .0729 .0700 .0783 .0655 .0704 
  (.2506) (.2600) (.2552) (.2688) (.2474) (.2559) 
Asian  .0042 .0043 .0024 .0020 .0054 .0054 
  (.0645) (.0656)  (.049)  (.0442) (.0735) (.0733) 
Indigenous  .0015 .0013 .0018 .0017 .0012 .0011 
  (.0383) (.0363) (.0423) (.0412) (.0352) (.0338) 
Dark  .3914 .3935 .4523 .4827 .3485 .3527 
  (.4881) (.4885) (.4977) (.4997) (.4765) (.4778) 
Age  of  Household  Head  43.07 55.79 42.23 56.44 43.66 55.49 
  (12.91) (10.13) (12.50) (10.56) (13.17)  (9.90) 
Household  Head  is  Female  0.18 0.30 0.14 0.29 0.20 0.31 
  (0.38) (0.46) (0.35) (0.45) (0.40) (0.46) 
Education  of  Household  Head  (Years).  5.37 3.61 3.73 1.84 6.52 4.41 
  (4.57) (3.90) (3.74) (2.53) (4.74) (4.15) 
 
The numbers in Column 1 represent 94,518 individuals in the full sample of adults over 18. The numbers in Column 
2 represent the sub sample (N = 25894) who are sons or daughters of the household head.   23
 Table 5: The Effects of Child Labor on Lifetime Wages and Poverty, Using Full Sample of Adults
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 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Indigenous -0.187
** -.137
**  0.064 .044 






 (.039)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Asian .201
** 0.238
** -0.011  .058
** 
 (0.039)  (0.090)  (0.037)  (0.031) 











 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.003) 




 (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.023)  (0.013) 
Constant -1.531
** 1.803
**    




**    
 (.026)  (.018)     
        
Direct Effect: 
) | E α (α 1 C CE C = ⋅ +  




) C α (α CE E ∂
∂
+   -16.1% -15.7%  8.2%  4.5% 
Total Effect  -20.3%  -26.7%  13.7%  7.8% 
        
Log Likelihood  -124601  -115441  -44325  -35212 
N 94321  94289  94289  94289 
 
  aAll specifications include dummy variables for state of residence. 
bMaximum likelihood variant of Heckman selection 
model. 
cProbit coefficients are transformed to be the change in probability of poverty status from a unit change in the 
regressor. 
dStandard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
eCorrects for 
nonreport of individual wage (column 1) or per capita household income (column 2).   24
Table 6: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Determinants of Years of Schooling 
Completed
 
    






Age .001  .006 
Female 1.401
** .054 
    
Household Demographics    
Rural -1.50
** .055 





Mixed Race  -.465
** .045 
Head Age  .002  .003 
Head Female  -.205
** .044 
Head Education  .236
** .009 
    
Household Income    
4
th Quintile  .971
** .062 
Middle Quintile  1.99
** .067 
2
nd Quintile  3.10
** .070 
Top Quintile  4.41
** .085 
    
Regional Economic Indicators    
Unemployment Rate  -7.04
* 3.92 
Per Capita Income/1000  1.12
** .234 
    
Constant 5.09
** .363 
Λ -.131  .078 
 
N 68508 
Log Likelihood  -82826 
1 Corrected standard errors. 
2 Instruments include regional industry shares, number of members of the household, and number of children under 
5 years of age. First-stage estimates are available from the authors on request. 
* Significant at .1 level. 
** Significant at .05 level.   25
 
Figure 1:  Cumulative Distribution of Age at Entry in the Workforce in Brazil, 


























Cohort aged 40-49 
Cohort aged 20-29
Cohort aged 30-39   26
Figure 2:  
Educational Attainment by Age at Entry in the Workforce in Brazil, 
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